title:         Bargaining and Society: A Statistical Model of the Ultimatum Game
authors:       Curtis Signorino, Kristopher Ramsay
entrydate:     2006-07-20 17:00:37
keywords:      bargaining, ultimatum, game theory, statistics, strategic, rationality
abstract:      In this paper we derive a statistical estimator for the popular Ultimatum bargaining game. Using monte carlo data generated by a strategic bargaining process, we show that the estimator correctly recovers the relationship between dependent variables, such as the proposed division and bargaining failure, relative to substantive variables that comprise players' utilities. We then use the model to analyze bargaining data in a number of contexts. The current example examines the effects of demographics on bargaining behavior in experiments conducted on U.S. and Russian participants.


http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=629

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