Title:      Balancing Competing Demands: Position-Taking and
Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Authors:    Rene Lindstaedt, Jonathan Slapin, Ryan Vander Wielen

Entrydate:  2009-07-31 08:19:50

Keywords:   Legislative Politics, European Parliament,
Comparative Politics, Bayesian IRT, Parties, Formal Theory

Abstract:   Parties value unity, yet, members of parliament face
competing demands, giving them incentives to deviate from the
party. For members of the European Parliament (MEPs), these
competing demands are national party and European party group
pressures. Here, we look at how MEPs respond to those competing
demands. We examine ideological shifts within a single
parliamentary term to assess how European Parliament (EP)
election proximity affects party group cohesion. Our formal
model of legislative behavior with multiple principals yields
the following hypothesis: When EP elections are proximate,
national party delegations shift toward national party
positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. For our
empirical test, we analyze roll call data from the fifth EP
(1999-2004) using Bayesian item response models. We find
significant movement among national party delegations as EP
elections approach, which is consistent with our theoretical
model, but surprising given the existing literature on EP
elections as second-order contests.

http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=930

**********************************************************
             Political Methodology E-Mail List
   Editors: Xun Pang        <[log in to unmask]>
            Jon C. Rogowski <[log in to unmask]>
**********************************************************
        Send messages to [log in to unmask]
  To join the list, cancel your subscription, or modify
           your subscription settings visit:

          http://polmeth.wustl.edu/polmeth.php

**********************************************************