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Political Methodology Society <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sat, 15 Jul 2006 11:23:44 -0500
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title:         Conditional Partisanship: Looking for Partisan Effects on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House
authors:       John Patty
entrydate:     2006-07-15 10:50:06
keywords:      Roll call voting, House Journal, Partisanship
abstract:      In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In particular, following a suggestion made by Sinclair (1995), I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Rather, the taking of such a vote represents a signal (perhaps to members of the House, but at least to the analyst) that the day’s ensuing business is important to at least one party’s leadership and that it is expected to be a close vote.

Considering the 102nd-107th Congresses, I show that a recorded vote on the Speaker’s approval of the Journal indicates that the legislative day’s business will be both more contentious (i.e., recorded votes have a smaller margin of passage) and more partisan (i.e., recorded votes are more likely to be “party unity” votes). In addition, the fit of Poole’s Optimal Classification estimates for legislators’ preferences is higher for recorded votes taken on such days. In addition, I discuss the marginal effect of the type and timing of legislative business on these findings, as well as the identity of who calls for the vote on the Journal. Of particular interest are the differential effects for appropriations and “procedural” matters.

http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=615

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