Title:      "The Size and Scope of International Unions: A
Coalition-Theoretic Approach"

Authors:    Nikitas Konstantinidis

Entrydate:  2008-07-10 21:54:02

Keywords:   international unions; coalition theory; size and
scope; flexible integration

Abstract:   This paper examines the endogenous strategic
considerations in simultaneously creating, enlarging, and
deepening an international union of countries within a framework
of variable geometry. We introduce a coalition-theoretic model to
examine the equilibrium relationship between union size and
scope. What is the equilibrium (stable) size and scope of an
international union and how do these variables interact? When
should we expect countries to take advantage of more flexible
modes of integration and how does that possibility affect the
pace and depth of integration? In tackling these questions, we
characterize the various policy areas of cooperation with
respect to their cross-country and cross-policy spillovers,
their efficiency scales, the heterogeneity of preferences, and
the general cost structure. We then go on to show that the
enlargement of a union and the widening of its policy scope are
too symbiotic and mutually reinforcing dynamic processes under
certain conditions. This is an exciting research puzzle given
that current game-theoretic predictions have been at odds with
the empirical reality of European integration.

http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=800

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