The responses thus far are in, and I thank my colleagues.
The arguments in favor are twofold (and I will share these when I
speak--I have mentioned the first):
1) Turnout
2) Moderate candidates
I don't doubt the first, although this is not a primary argument being
used by the proponents. And my own bias is that the potential
problems outweigh the turnout gain (which most empirical studies show
to be small, though significant, in the primary).
But on the 2nd, I am not convinced by the argument that the top two
(this is not an "open" or "blanket" system, and unless someone can
convince me otherwise, is not comparable to those systems, but I will
take the advice to talk to Mike and Jonathan) produces moderation.
My intuition on this relied on the logic from Cox's book--the
strategic imperative here is NOT to maximize the votes (or reach 50% +
1). Instead, the imperative is to accumulate enough votes to finish
comfortably ahead (in Cox's formulation, outside of the boundaries of
standard error in pre-election polls) of the THIRD place candidate.
In a three candidate race, this means a candidate needs about 40% of
the vote. In a four candidate race, around 30%, in a five candidate
race, 25%, and so on.
This does not, it seems to me, necessarily induce moderation. Given
what we know about patterns of political interest, intensity, and
turnout, a very viable strategy is to appeal to, and hold on to, and
encourage turnout among, a distinct segment of the population, one
which is very likely to be ideologically extreme.
As one writer put it (and I'm pleased to see someone much smarter than
me reached the same conclusion, surely in a far more elegant way):
"The best source may be Bernie Grofman. Among other things, Bernie
has a paper that demonstrates that step-wise elimination of candidates
will allow the candidates at modes (not medians) to survive early
rounds. The Oregon proposals is just two rounds, but the logic is
the same. In a unidimensional world where the electorate is
distributed normally, then there is one mode and candidates will drift
to it until it is covered; other candidates will try to come in at
least second by finding an open space in the distribution that will
produce at least a second-place finish in the first round. In lumpy
and multidimensional worlds, there simply is no guarantee that median
candidates are advantaged."
---
Paul Gronke Ph: 503-517-7393
Professor Fax:
Reed College
3203 SE Woodstock Blvd.
Portland OR 97202
http://www.reed.edu/~gronkep
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