Title:      A Statistical Model of Electoral Coordination

Authors:    Ines Levin, Gabriel Katz

Entrydate:  2009-07-03 22:54:27

Keywords:   electoral coordination, number of candidates,
Bayesian estimation, hierarchical modeling, Uruguay

Abstract:   During an electoral period, voters and elites
interact to determine the number of candidates running for
office, as well as the number of candidates getting votes.
Neglecting the mutual effects between the demand and supply of
candidates may lead to biased parameter estimates and incorrect
inferences about variables of interest, such as district
magnitude. In this paper, we develop a multilevel model of
voters-elites interactions to explain electoral coordination at
the district level in Uruguay. Elections in this country are
particularly useful to test our hypotheses due to the large
variations in district magnitude across the country. We find
that mutual supply and demand effects are significant for
explaining the number of legislative candidate lists offered by
parties, as well as the number of parties and lists voters
choose to support.

http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=910

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